Even with confi dentiality there still remain threats for the website customer. An adversary who can’t read the contents of your encrypted message might still be able to change a few bits in it, resulting in a valid order for, say, a completely different item or perhaps 1,000 units of the item. There are techniques to detect, if not prevent, such tampering. A protocol that detects such message tampering provides data integrity . The adversary could alternatively transmit an extra copy of your message in a replay attack . To the website, it would appear as though you had simply ordered another of the same item you ordered the fi rst time. A protocol that detects replays provides originality . Originality would not, however, preclude the adversary intercepting your order, waiting a while, then transmitting it—in effect, delaying your order. The adversary could thereby arrange for the item to arrive on your doorstep while you are away on vacation, when it can be easily snatched. A protocol that detects such delaying tactics is said to provide timeliness . Data integrity, originality, and timeliness are considered aspects of the more general property of integrity .
Another threat to the customer is unknowingly being directed to a false website. This can result from a DNS attack, in which false information is entered in a domain name server or the name service cache of the customer’s computer.
This leads to translating a correct URL into an incorrect IP address—the address of a false website. A protocol that ensures that you really are talking to whom you think you’re talking is said to provide authentication . Authentication entails integrity since it is meaningless to say that a message came from a certain participant if it is no longer the same message.
The owner of the website can be attacked as well. Some websites have been defaced; the fi les that make up the website content have been remotely accessed and modifi ed without authorization. That is an issue of access control : enforcing the rules regarding who is allowed to do what. Websites have also been subject to denial of service (DoS) attacks, during which would-be customers are unable to access the website because it is being overwhelmed by bogus requests. Ensuring a degree of access is called availability .
Finally, the customer and website face threats from each other. Each could unilaterally deny that a transaction occurred, or invent a nonexistent transaction. Nonrepudiation means that a bogus denial (repudiation) of a transaction can be disproved, and nonforgeability means that claims of a bogus (forged) transaction can be disproved.
Although these examples have been based on Web transactions, there are comparable security threats in almost every network context. Although the Internet was designed with the redundancy to survive physical attacks such as bombing, it was not originally designed to provide the kind of security we have been discussing. Internet security mechanisms have essentially been patches. If a comprehensive redesign of the Internet were to take place, integrating security would likely be the foremost driving factor. That possibility makes this chapter all the more pertinent.
The main tools for securing networked systems are cryptography and firewalls. The bulk of this chapter concerns cryptography-based security.
Reference to : Network Security, Know it All.
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